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EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENSIONS 
IN BOURDIEU’S CONCEPTION 
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Abstract: Th is paper explores Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conception of social science. In 
particular, it aims to show that the com-
mon assumption that Bourdieu remains 
trapped in a positivist paradigm does not 
do justice to his multifaceted account of 
social science. In order to illustrate the 
complexity of Bourdieu’s conception of 
social science, this study scrutinises ten 
epistemological tensions which can be 
found in his writings on the nature of sys-
tematic forms of knowledge production. 
In view of these epistemological tensions, 
a more fi ne-grained picture emerges 
which demonstrates that Bourdieu com-
pels us to refl ect upon the complexity of 
the various tasks intrinsic to the pursuit 
of a critical social science. Th e paper 
concludes by discussing the limitations 
and shortcomings of the epistemological 
presuppositions that underpin Bourdieu’s 
refl exive sociology.
Keywords: Bourdieu; epistemology; 
knowledge; philosophy of science; positiv-
ism; refl exive sociology; social science; 
sociology of knowledge
Epistemologické tenze v Bourdieuho 
pojetí sociální vědy
Abstrakt: Článek zkoumá pojetí soci-
ální vědy Pierra Bourdieuho. Analýza 
osvětluje hlavní epistemologické předpo-
klady, jež podepírají Bourdieho obranu 
refl exivní sociologie jako vědeckého 
snažení. V  literatuře převládá názor, že 
Bourdieu má ve většině svých spisů sklon 
zastávat pozitivistické pojetí sociální 
vědy. Při podrobnějším prozkoumání 
Bourdieuho pojetí sociální vědy se však 
ozřejmuje, že domněnka o jeho přetrvá-
vajícím zachycení v  pozitivistickém pa-
radigmatu nevystihuje komplexitu jeho 
mnohostranného uvažovaní o  sociální 
vědě. Tato studie, aby tuto komplexitu 
ilustrovala, zkoumá deset epistemologic-
kých tenzí, jež lze nalézt v  Bourdieuho 
pracích o  povaze systematických forem 
produkce vědění. Vyvstává tak jemnější 
obraz, jenž demonstruje, že Bourdieu 
nás vede k  tomu, abychom refl ektovali 
komplexitu různých úkolů spojených 
s úsilím o kritickou sociální vědu. Článek 
završuje diskuse nad omezeními a  ne-
dostatky epistemologických presupozic 
Bourdieuho refl exivní sociologie.
Klíčová slova: Bourdieu; epistemologie; 
vědění; fi losofi e vědy; pozitivismus; refl e-
xivní sociologie; sociální věda; sociologie 
vědění
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Th e main purpose of this paper is to explore Pierre Bourdieu’s conception 
of social science. To this end, the analysis sheds light on the main episte-
mological presuppositions that undergird Bourdieu’s defence of refl exive 
sociology as a  scientifi c endeavour. Th e predominant view in the litera-
ture is that, in most of his writings, Bourdieu has a  tendency to embrace 
a  positivist conception of social science.1 When examining Bourdieu’s 
conception of social science in more detail, however, it becomes clear that 
the assumption that he remains trapped in a positivist paradigm does not 
do justice to his multifaceted account of social science. In order to illustrate 
the complexity of Bourdieu’s notion of social science, the following study 
scrutinises ten epistemological tensions which can be found in his writ-
ings on the nature of systematic forms of knowledge production. In view of 
these epistemological tensions, a more fi ne-grained picture emerges which 
demonstrates that Bourdieu invites us, and indeed compels us, to refl ect 
upon the complexity of the various tasks intrinsic to the pursuit of a critical 
social science.
Despite the fact that it would be erroneous to suggest that Bourdieu’s so-
cial theory is based on a merely positivist conception of scientifi c knowledge 
production, and even if, as shall be shown in this paper, the philosophical 
assumptions underlying his notion of science are far more complex than 
commonly acknowledged, it is imperative to refl ect upon the limitations 
1  See, for example: Luc BOLTANSKI, De la critique. Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation. 
Paris: Gallimard 2009, p. 39–82. Patrice BONNEWITZ, La sociologie de P. Bourdieu. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France 1998, p. 34. Ciaran CRONIN, “Epistemological Vigilance and 
the Project of a Sociology of Knowledge.” Social Epistemology, vol. 11, 1997, no. 2, p. 203–215, 
here p. 213. Robin GRILLER, “Th e Return of the Subject? Th e Methodology of Pierre Bourdieu.” 
In: ROBBINS, D. (ed.), Pierre Bourdieu. Volume I. London: Sage 2000 [1996], p. 187–211, here 
p.  201–204. Richard JENKINS, Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge 1992, p.  60. Richard 
JENKINS, “Language, Culture and Sociology: Pierre Bourdieu in Context.” History of the 
Human Sciences, vol. 7, 1994, no. 4, p. 95–104, here p. 102. Nedim KARAKAYALI, “Reading 
Bourdieu with Adorno: Th e Limits of Critical Th eory and Refl exive Sociology.” Sociology, vol. 
38, 2004, no. 2, p. 351–368, here p. 356. Bernard LAHIRE, “Présentation : Pour une sociologie 
à l’état vif.” In: LAHIRE, B. (ed.), Le travail sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu : dettes et critiques. 
Paris: La Découverte & Syros 1999, p. 5-20, here p. 16. Simon SUSEN, Th e Foundations of the 
Social: Between Critical Th eory and Refl exive Sociology. Oxford: Bardwell Press 2007, p. 217 
and 225–226.
I would like to thank Elena Knox as well as two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and 
useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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and shortcomings of the epistemological presuppositions that underpin 
Bourdieu’s refl exive sociology. Although he off ers an insightful account 
of the nature of social-scientifi c knowledge, Bourdieu’s epistemological 
framework suff ers from a  number of serious analytical fl aws. Th us, while 
the abovementioned epistemological tensions indicate that Bourdieu puts 
forward a highly diff erentiated approach to systematic forms of knowledge 
production, his conception of social science remains caught up in various 
presuppositional antinomies, which he seeks but fails to overcome.
1. Social science as a scientifi c project versus social science as a political 
project
Th e fi rst, and arguably the most fundamental, epistemological tension which 
can be identifi ed in Bourdieu’s writings stems from the recognition that 
there are compelling grounds to consider social science as a  scientifi c en-
deavour, just as there are good reasons to regard social science as a political 
endeavour. Even though Bourdieu, in most of his writings, embraces both 
views, he acknowledges that the simultaneous commitment to scientifi c and 
political forms of knowledge production is not a straightforward enterprise. 
Hence, it is worth briefl y examining the presuppositional grounds of these 
two epistemological perspectives.
One of the central assumptions in Bourdieu’s oeuvre is the view that 
the social sciences in general and sociology in particular can and should 
be regarded as scientifi c endeavours. Th e “scientifi c ambition that the social 
sciences affi  rm by defi nition”2 is indicative of the fact that the systematic 
study of the human world is not motivated by the imaginative invention 
of speculative narratives based on random thought experiments, but aimed 
at the purposive construction of explanatory models concerned with the 
methodical exploration of social arrangements. To insist on the idea that the 
sociological study of reality can be considered a “scientifi c analysis”3 of so-
ciety means to suggest that we need to conceive of “sociology as a science”,4 
2  Pierre BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes. Paris: Seuil 1997, p.  40 (my translation); 
original text: “L’ambition scientifi que que les sciences sociales affi  rment par defi nition.”
3  Pierre BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique. Paris: Minuit 1980, p. 8 (my translation); original text: 
“analyse scientifi que”.
4  Pierre BOURDIEU, “Si le monde social m’est supportable, c’est parce que je peux m’indigner”. 
Entretien avec Antoine Spire. Paris: Éditions de l’Aube 2001, p. 7 (my translation); original text: 
“La sociologie comme science”.
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namely “the science of society”5 par excellence. Nevertheless, it is far from 
uncontroversial on what presuppositional grounds it is possible to justify the 
claim that a particular mode of thought can be characterised as “scientifi c”, 
that is, as an epistemic approach which is founded on the methodical and 
evidence-based study of reality. In light of his rigorous defence of sociology 
as “a science”,6 Bourdieu cannot avoid being confronted with questions such 
as the following: “Are the social sciences, and in particular sociology, really 
sciences? Why do you feel they need to claim scientifi city?”7 Bourdieu’s an-
swer to these questions is symptomatic of his fi rm conviction that sociology 
can and should be regarded as a scientifi c endeavour: “Sociology”,8 he states, 
seems “to have all the properties that defi ne a science”.9
Amongst the properties of science are three constitutive features of sci-
entifi c knowledge: fi rst, the positivity of scientifi c knowledge, i.e. the belief in 
the reliability of experience-based knowledge;10 second, the objectivity of sci-
entifi c knowledge, i.e. the belief in the possibility of value-free knowledge;11 
5  See Lahouari ADDI, Sociologie et anthropologie chez Pierre Bourdieu. Paris : La Découverte 
& Syros 2002, p. 195: “Le projet de faire de la sociologie la science de la société par excellence,” 
(italics in original). See also ibid., p. 196: “En fait, Bourdieu considère la sociologie comme 
science de toutes les pratiques sociales.”
6  See, for example, Pierre BOURDIEU – Jean-Claude CHAMBOREDON – Jean-Claude 
PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques. Paris: Éditions de l’École 
des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales – Mouton 1968, p. 36, and BOURDIEU, Entretien avec 
Antoine Spire, p. 7.
7  Pierre BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble.” In: Sociology in Question. London: Sage 
1993 [1984], p. 8–19, here p. 8 (with the exception of the word “scientifi city”, italics removed 
from the entire quotation).
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid. (italics added).
10  On Bourdieu’s critical account of “positive knowledge”, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Le 
sens pratique, p. 7 and 210. Pierre BOURDIEU, Leçon sur la leçon. Paris: Minuit 1982, p. 14. 
Pierre BOURDIEU, “La cause de la science.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 
106–107, 1995, p. 3–10, here p. 8. Pierre BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité. Paris: 
Raisons d’agir 2001, p. 11 and 34.
On this point, see also: Catherine COLLIOT-THÉLÈNE, “La Sociologie Réfl exive, 
l’Anthropologie, l’Histoire.” Critique, vol. LI, 1995, no. 579–580, p. 631–645, here p. 631–632. 
Philippe CORCUFF, “Pour une nouvelle sociologie critique : éthique, critique herméneutique 
et utopie critique.” In: LOJKINE, J. (ed.), Les sociologues critiques du capitalisme : en hommage 
à Pierre Bourdieu Paris: Collection Actuel Marx Confrontation, Presses Universitaires de 
France 2002, p.  147–160, here p.  149. John CROWLEY, “Pierre Bourdieu’s Anti-Politics of 
Transparency.” Innovation: Th e European Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 15, 2002, 
no. 2, p. 149–166, here p. 152. KARAKAYALI, “Reading Bourdieu with Adorno,” p. 355-356.
11  On Bourdieu’s critical account of “objective knowledge”, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Le 
sens pratique, p. 40 and 210. BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 11 and 14. Pierre 
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and, third, the universality of scientifi c knowledge, i.e. the belief in the valid-
ity of context-transcending knowledge.12 Positive knowledge in the social 
sciences is gained from observing the phenomenal functioning of the social 
world; objective knowledge in the social sciences is generated from describ-
ing the relational functioning of the social world; and universal knowledge in 
the social sciences is derived from uncovering the lawful functioning of the 
BOURDIEU, “For a Sociology of Sociologists.” In: Sociology in Question London: Sage 1993 
[1984], p.  49–53, here p.  50 and 53. Pierre BOURDIEU, “Th e Paradox of the Sociologist.” 
In: Sociology in Question London: Sage 1993 [1984], p. 54–59. BOURDIEU, “La cause de la 
science,” p. 8. BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 157. BOURDIEU, Science de la science 
et réfl exivité, p. 41. BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. 
Préalables épistémologiques, p. 51–52.
On this point, see also: BONNEWITZ, La sociologie de P. Bourdieu, p. 17, 18, 34, and 35. Jean-
Paul BRONCKART – Marie-Noëlle SCHURMANS, “Pierre Bourdieu – Jean Piaget : habitus, 
schèmes et construction du psychologique.” In: LAHIRE, B. (ed.), Le travail sociologique 
de Pierre Bourdieu: dettes et critiques Paris: La Découverte & Syros 1999, p.  153–175, here 
p. 160. Craig CALHOUN, “Habitus, Field, and Capital: Historical Specifi city in the Th eory of 
Practice.” In: Critical Social Th eory. Oxford: Blackwell 1995, p. 132–161, here p. 134. Jean-Yves 
CARO, “La sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu : éléments pour une théorie du champ politique.” 
Revue française de science politique, vol. 30, 1980, no. 6, p.  1171–1197, here 1171–1172. 
Aaron V. CICOUREL, “Aspects of Structural and Processual Th eories of Knowledge.” In: 
CALHOUN, C. – LIPUMA, E. – POSTONE, M. (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 1993, p. 89–115, here p. 94. Hubert DREYFUS – Paul RABINOW, 
“Can there be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?” In: SHUSTERMAN, 
R. (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell 1999, p. 84–93, here p. 89. Dick PELS, 
“Knowledge, Politics and Anti-Politics: Toward a Critical Appraisal of Bourdieu’s Concept of 
Intellectual Autonomy.” Th eory and Society, vol. 24, 1995, no. 1, p. 79–104, here p. 88. Louis 
PINTO, Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie du monde social. Paris: Albin Michel 1998, p. 125. Loïc 
WACQUANT, “Epistemic Refl exivity.” In: BOURDIEU, P. – WACQUANT, L., An Invitation 
to Refl exive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p. 36–46, here p. 36–37.
12  On Bourdieu’s critical account of “universal knowledge”, see, for example: BOURDIEU, 
Leçon sur la leçon, p. 25. Pierre BOURDIEU, “Espace social et genèse des ‘classes’.” Actes de la 
recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 52–53, 1984, p. 3–14, here p. 4. BOURDIEU, Entretien avec 
Antoine Spire, p. 31–32. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 10–13.
On this point, see also: ADDI, Sociologie et anthropologie chez Pierre Bourdieu, p. 195–196. 
BONNEWITZ, La sociologie de P.  Bourdieu, p.  12–13. Joseph D. LEWANDOWSKI, 
“Th ematizing Embeddedness: Refl exive Sociology as Interpretation.” Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, vol. 30, 2000, no. 1, p.  49–66, here p.  49. Frédéric VANDENBERGHE, “‘Th e Real 
is Relational:’ An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s Generative Structuralism.” 
Sociological Th eory, vol. 17, 1999, no. 1, p. 32–67, here p. 34–35. Loïc WACQUANT, “Zwischen 
Soziologie und Philosophie - Bourdieus Wurzeln.” In: REHBEIN, B. – SAALMANN, G. – 
SCHWENGEL, H. (eds.), Pierre Bourdieus Th eorie des Sozialen: Probleme und Perspektiven. 
Konstanz: UVK 2003, p. 59–65, here p. 60–62.
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social world.13 In brief, the scientifi city of sociological knowledge depends 
on its exponents’ capacity to demonstrate that its epistemology meets the 
criteria of positivity, objectivity, and universality.
Nonetheless, Bourdieu admits that “[t]he question of knowing whether 
or not sociology is a science”14 is an extremely complex one which can hardly 
be given a clear and unambiguous answer. In fact, it may well be argued that 
sociology is a non-scientifi c project if it can be shown that it fails to meet the 
criteria of science, these constituting a disciplinary framework which is not 
only based on the methodical and evidence-based study of the world but also 
oriented towards the generation of positively, objectively, and universally 
valid knowledge. As Bourdieu remarks, “[s]ociology has the unfortunate 
privilege of being constantly confronted with the question of its status as 
a science”.15 Hence, Bourdieu is willing to concede that there are good rea-
sons to call the alleged scientifi city of sociology into question, one of the 
main reasons being that, in the social sciences, there is a fi ne line between 
“scientifi c work”16 (travail scientifi que) and “sociological engagement”17
(engagement sociologique). In other words, one of the key challenges to be 
confronted when attempting to defend the scientifi c status of sociology is to 
face up to the political nature of social research in the Bourdieusian sense.
Given that the social world is never simply a world of facticity but always 
also a world of validity, sociology is bound to confront the paradoxical task 
of producing both descriptive and normative knowledge about the human 
world. On the one hand, sociology seeks to provide descriptive knowledge in 
that it aims to give accurate accounts of how the social world is organised. 
On the other hand, sociology can generate normative knowledge insofar as 
it is motivated by the ambition to develop engaged accounts of how the social 
world could and should be organised. Both in the social world and in the 
social sciences, factuality and normativity are intimately intertwined. Th us, 
the interlacement of factuality and normativity is relevant not only to the 
sociological functioning of the human world, but also to the sociological 
engagement with and the knowledge production about the human world, 
13  Cf. Ted BENTON – Ian CRAIB, Philosophy of Social Science: Th e Philosophical Foundations 
of Social Th ought. Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001, p. 13–22.
14  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 103 (my translation); original text: “La question de savoir si la sociologie 
est ou non une science [...].”
15  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 8.




for a sociology that fails to account for the ubiquity of normativity is a so-
ciology that does not succeed in explaining the transformability of society. 
Social arrangements are never everlasting, because the relations established 
between materially and symbolically interconnected actors are constantly at 
stake. “One of the major diffi  culties”,18 for sociology, “lies in the fact that its 
objects are stakes in social struggles”.19 If “criteria of scientifi city”20 – such 
as objectivity, adequacy, and verifi ability – compete with criteria of political 
normativity – such as legitimacy, effi  cacy, and implementability –, then the 
sociological project is characterised by both the rigorous search for scientifi c 
validation and a normative commitment to exploring social potentials for 
political transformation.
2. Social science as an uncovering project versus social science as 
a reconstructing project
A second epistemological tension in Bourdieu’s writings emanates from the 
assumption that social science can be conceived of as both an uncovering 
and a reconstructing project. Th e epistemological position that social science 
is essentially an uncovering enterprise is founded on what may be described 
as a positivist view of science. According to this perspective, it is the task 
of the natural sciences to scrutinise the underlying laws that determine the 
constitution of the physical world, just as it is the task of the social sciences 
to shed light on the hidden forces that shape the organisation of the human 
world. In Bourdieu’s words, “[t]he physical world has immanent tendencies, 
and the same goes for the social world”.21 In order “to uncover the laws that 
regulate [...] that ‘energy of social physics’”,22 we need to draw an analytical 
distinction between “visible relations”23 and “invisible relations”:24 whereas 
the former are directly accessible to human observation, the latter are hid-
18  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 9.
19  Ibid.
20  See BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 47: “critère de la scientifi cité”.
21  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 121 (my translation); original text: “Le 
monde physique a des tendances immanentes, et il en va de même du monde social.”
22  Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc WACQUANT, “Interest, Habitus, Rationality.” In: An Invitation 
to Refl exive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p. 115–140, here p. 118. See also Pierre 
BOURDIEU, Th e Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press 1990 [1980], p. 122.
23  BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p. 13 (my translation); original text: “des relations 
visibles”.
24  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “des relations invisibles”.
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den from immediate scrutiny. If there is no straightforward correspondence 
between social appearances, whose existence is symptomatic of the constitu-
tion of the human world, and social substances, whose existence is intrinsic 
to the constitution of the human world, then there is no reason to believe 
that common–sense knowledge, which is derived from immediate experi-
ence, is capable of grasping the complexity of human reality, which escapes 
immediate experience. Indeed, to assume that there is no straightforward 
correspondence between social appearances and social substances means 
to suggest that there is no homology between the phenomenology and the 
ontology of the social world: the social world is not necessarily what it ap-
pears to be, and the social world does not necessarily appear to be what it is.
Social science, however, is concerned not only with uncovering the un-
derlying structures that constitute the ontology of relationally constructed 
realms but also with reconstructing the symbolic elements that make up the 
phenomenology of culturally mediated meanings. We need to reconstruct 
the infi nite meanings attached to the world by human actors in order to 
understand that the symbolically mediated search for intelligibility plays 
a pivotal role in the construction process of every society. Yet, if we are pre-
pared to give up “the illusion of transparency”25 of the variegated causality 
underlying the structuration of society, we must also be willing to abandon 
the idea that ordinary forms of comprehensibility can be a reliable source of 
representational adequacy. It is for this reason that “refl exive sociology”26 (la 
sociologie réfl exive), in the Bourdieusian sense, is opposed to “spontaneous 
sociology”27 (la sociologie spontanée): the former acknowledges the “princi-
ple of the unconscious”,28 recognising that “profound causes which escape 
our consciousness”29 can have signifi cant consequences which shape our 
consciousness; by contrast, the latter remains caught up in the “principle of 
consciousness”, suggesting that central elements which constitute our con-
sciousness can have considerable eff ects derived from our consciousness. If 
25  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 29 (my translation); original text: “l’illusion de la transparence”.
26  See Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc WACQUANT, An Invitation to Refl exive Sociology. Cambridge: 
Polity Press 1992. See also, for example, Pierre BOURDIEU, In Other Words: Essays Towards 
a Refl exive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press 1990.
27  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 93 (my translation); original text: “la « sociologie spontanée »”.
28  Ibid., p. 31 (italics added), (my translation); original text: “principe de la non-conscience”.




the human “unconscious is made up of its social conditions of production”,30 
it is the task of refl exive sociology to bring these conditions to the fore 
and, in so doing, to problematise the seemingly unproblematic, that is, the 
ensemble of taken-for-granted assumptions which lie at the heart of the col-
lective unconscious of a given society.
What is most hidden is what everyone agrees about, agreeing so much that they 
don’t even mention them, the things that are beyond question, that go without 
saying.31
In the social world, the most blatant is oft en the most latent, for our 
daily immersion in what seems obvious to us makes us blind to relative arbi-
trariness. Social science needs to bring our background assumptions to the 
foreground in order to account for the historical contingency that permeates 
all collectively established modes of intelligibility.
Illusion is not, as such, illusory. [...] Agents have a subjective experience that is 
not the full truth of what they do but which is part of the truth of what they do.32
It is therefore the task of sociology to explore social objectivity in terms 
of human subjectivity and human subjectivity in terms of social objectivity. 
Even if we seek to uncover the underlying mechanisms that determine both 
the constitution and the evolution of social objectivity, we are obliged to 
reconstruct the various meanings attributed to reality by examining actors’ 
symbolic construction of society.
3. Social science as an explanatory project versus social science as an 
interpretive project
A third epistemological tension, which is closely related to the previous one, 
derives from the premise that social science can be conceived of as both 
an explanatory and an interpretive project. In the philosophy of social sci-
ence, the tension between these two epistemological positions is generally 
referred to in terms of the diff erence between the method called Erklären (in 
French: expliquer; in English: explaining) and the method called Verstehen 
30  BOURDIEU, “For a Sociology of Sociologists,” p. 50.
31  Ibid., p. 51.
32  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 17.
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(in French: comprendre; in English: understanding).33 In essence, the ten-
sion between these epistemological perspectives illustrates that Bourdieu’s 
conception of social science is based on a twofold concern: on the one hand, 
Bourdieu regards social science as a tool by which to explain the nature of 
the underlying structures which determine human actors’ engagement with 
the world; on the other hand, Bourdieu considers social science as a tool by 
which to understand the nature of fi eld-specifi c discourses through which 
human actors interpret the world. In the former sense, the task of social 
science is to uncover the interest-laden lawfulness of the human world; in 
the latter sense, the task of social science is to examine the meaning-laden 
discursiveness of the human world. It would be fair to suggest that positivist 
trust in the explanatory power of modern science and hermeneutic reliance 
on the interpretive power of human actors are two irreducible components 
of Bourdieu’s refl exive conception of knowledge production.
It is common to conceive of the dichotomous distinction between 
objectivist and interpretivist approaches in terms of “a traditional contrast 
between an empiricist theory, according to which perception borrows its 
structures from reality, and a constructivist theory which says that objects 
are only perceived through an act of construction”.34 In the former view, we 
have direct access to reality, and science permits us to produce representa-
tionally accurate – and, therefore, objective – knowledge about the social 
world. In the latter view, we have only mediated access to reality, and science 
enables us to generate linguistically codifi ed – and, therefore, interpretive – 
knowledge about the social world.
Th us, from a  Bourdieusian point of view, the social sciences are 
confronted with the ambivalent task of producing both explanatory and 
interpretive – i.e. both representational and expressional, both factual 
and constructional, both objective and subjective, and both descriptive 
and normative – types of knowledge. As an explanatory form of objective 
knowledge production, the social sciences need to be guided by principles 
such as causality, impartiality, and symmetry35 in order to uncover the struc-
33  See BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p.  42. See also, for example, Karl-
Otto APEL, Understanding and Explanation: A  Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective. 
Trans. G. Warnke. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1984 [1979], and William OUTHWAITE, 
“Naturalisms and Antinaturalisms.” In: MAY, T. – WILLIAMS, M. (eds.), Knowing the Social 
World. Buckingham: Open University Press 1998, p. 22–36.
34  BOURDIEU, “Th e Paradox of the Sociologist,” p. 54 (italics added).
35  See BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 42. See also BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 156–157.
Simon Susen
53
turally determined interest-ladenness of society. As an interpretive form of 
subjective knowledge construction, the social sciences need to be guided by 
principles such as signifi ability, partiality, and refl exivity in order to make 
sense of the symbolically constituted meaning-ladenness of society. In short, 
a social-scientifi c engagement with the world requires both an explanatory 
and an interpretive study of human reality.
4. Social science as an assertive project versus social science as a refl exive 
project
A fourth epistemological tension that can be found in Bourdieu’s writings 
arises from the following assumption: social science is to be understood 
as both an assertive and a  refl exive project. As an assertive project, social 
science has a constative function: its analysis of human reality is based on 
the methodical representation of social facts. As a  refl exive project, social 
science has a  critical function: its analysis of human reality is committed 
to questioning the legitimacy of established forms of normativity. To the 
extent that a culturally constructed reality is never only an objective world 
of facticity but always also a normative world of validity, social science is 
not exclusively concerned with the descriptive representation of social facts 
but also aimed at the critical problematisation of social norms. Indeed, it is 
the task of a refl exive social science to question the pervasive givenness of 
relationally constructed forms of reality by shedding light on the relative 
arbitrariness of social normativity. What can be socially constructed can 
be theoretically deconstructed and practically reconstructed. A  critical 
engagement with society invites us to exploit the intrinsic reconstructability 
of human reality. Th e social is never forever, and the task of a critical social 
science is to translate the alleged eternity of the “for ever” into the genuine 
contingency of the “for now”, thereby opening a horizon of possibilities “for 
tomorrow”.
Yet “refl exivity”,36 in the Bourdieusian sense, is not limited to the critical 
examination of the social world but also involves the self-critical problema-
36  On Bourdieu’s conception of refl exivity, see, for example: BOURDIEU, In Other Words: 
Essays Towards a  Refl exive Sociology. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité. 
BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, An Invitation to Refl exive Sociology.
In the secondary literature, see, for example: James BOHMAN, “Refl exivity, Agency and 
Constraint: the Paradoxes of Bourdieu’s Sociology of Knowledge.” Social Epistemology, 
vol. 11, 1997, no. 2, p. 171–186. Anna BOSCHETTI, “Réfl exion sur le langage et réfl exivité.” 
In: PINTO, L. – SAPIRO, G. – CHAMPAGNE, P.  (eds.), Pierre Bourdieu, sociologue. 
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tisation of social science. Bourdieu’s plea to his colleagues to “subject the op-
erations of sociological practice to the polemics of epistemological reason”,37
and thereby promote “an attitude of vigilance”38 which obliges sociologists 
to engage in the “psychoanalysis of the scientifi c spirit”,39 seeks to bring the 
sociological background of ideas to the sociological foreground of critique: “an 
Paris: Fayard 2004, p. 161–183. Ian BURKITT, “Th e Situated Social Scientist: Refl exivity 
and Perspective in the Sociology of Knowledge.” Social Epistemology, vol. 11, 1997, no. 2, 
p. 193–202. Patrick CHAMPAGNE, “La sociologie réfl exive de Bourdieu.” Sciences Humaines, 
Numéro Spécial: L’œuvre de Pierre Bourdieu, 2002, p. 96-100. Yves DEZALAY, “Une 
leçon de réfl exivité.” In: MAUGER, G. (ed.), Rencontres avec Pierre Bourdieu. Broissieux, 
Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant 2005, p. 233–238. Steff ani ENGLER – Karin 
ZIMMERMANN, “Das Soziologische Denken Bourdieus - Refl exivität in kritischer Absicht.” 
In: BITTLINGMAYER, U. H. – EICKELPASCH, R. – KASTNER, R. – RADEMACHER, 
C. (eds.), Th eorie als Kampf? Zur Politischen Soziologie Pierre Bourdieus. Opladen: Leske 
& Budrich 2002, p. 35–47. Koenraad GELDOF, “Authority, Reading, Refl exivity: Pierre 
Bourdieu and the Aesthetic Judgment of Kant.” Diacritics, vol. 27, 1997, no. 1, p.  20–43. 
Yves GINGRAS, “Réfl exivité et sociologie de la connaissance scientifi que.” In: PINTO, 
L. – SAPIRO, G. – CHAMPAGNE, P. (eds.), Pierre Bourdieu, sociologue Paris: Fayard 2004, 
p. 337–347. Johan HEILBRON, “Refl exivity and its Consequences.” European Journal of Social 
Th eory, vol. 2, 1999, no. 3, p. 298–306. David INGLIS, “Pierre Bourdieu: Science of Science and 
Refl exivity.” European Journal of Social Th eory, vol. 8, 2005, no. 3, p. 375–379. Jane KENWAY 
– Julie MCLEOD, “Bourdieu’s Refl exive Sociology and ‘Spaces of Points of View’: Whose 
Refl exivity, which Perspective?” British Journal of Sociology of Education, vol. 25, 2004, no. 4, 
p. 525–544. Hans-Herbert KÖGLER, “Alienation as Epistemological Source: Refl exivity and 
Social Background aft er Mannheim and Bourdieu.” Social Epistemology, vol. 11, 1997, no. 2, 
p. 141–164. Hans-Herbert KÖGLER, “Reconceptualizing Refl exive Sociology: A Reply.” Social 
Epistemology, vol. 11, 1997, no. 2, p. 223–250. Lois MCNAY, “Gender, Habitus and the Field: 
Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Refl exivity.” Th eory, Culture & Society, vol. 16, 1999, no. 1, 
p. 95–117. Eric MOLLET, Bourdieu et Laruelle : Sociologie réfl exive et non-philosophie. Paris: 
Pétra 2003. Javier NOYA, “La refl exividad de la sociología y la sociología de la refl exividad.” 
In: NOYA, J. (ed.), Cultura, desigualdad y refl exividad. La sociología de Pierre Bourdieu. 
Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata 2003, p. 42–64. Dick PELS, “Refl exivity: One Step Up.” 
Th eory, Culture & Society, vol. 17, 2000, no. 3, p. 1–25. Lutz RAPHAEL, “Forschungskonzepte 
für eine ‘refl exive Soziologie’ – Anmerkungen zum Denk- und Arbeitsstil Pierre Bourdieus.” 
In: MÜLLER-DOOHM, S. (ed.), Jenseits der Utopie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1991, 
p. 236–266. Simon SUSEN, Th e Foundations of the Social: Between Critical Th eory and Refl exive 
Sociology, p. 133–137, 139, 215, 216, 222, 225, 226, 227–229, 235, 236, 243, 249, 256, and 276. 
Loïc WACQUANT, “Towards a  Refl exive Sociology: A  Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu.” 
Sociological Th eory, vol. 7, 1989, no. 1, p. 26–63.
37  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 13 (my translation); original text: “Il faut soumettre les opérations de la 
pratique sociologique à la polémique de la raison épistémologique”.
38  Ibid., p. 13–14 (my translation); original text: “une attitude de la vigilance”.
39  Ibid., p. 14 (my translation); original text: “la « psychanalyse de l’esprit scientifi que »”.
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analysis of the social conditions in which sociological works are produced”40 
is fundamental to demonstrating that intellectual thought is generated in 
a value-laden space shaped by, rather than in a neutral space detached from, 
the constraints of social reality. In this sense, “the sociology of sociology”41 
and “the sociology of other sociologists”42 should always be an integral part 
of the sociology of society and the sociology of other social actors. Only if 
sociologists, as situated social actors, dare to make their individual uncon-
scious the subject of scrutiny can they produce truly refl exive accounts of the 
collective unconscious of society.
If, following Durkheim, “the unconscious is the forgetting of history”,43 
then, following Bourdieu, “the unconscious of a discipline is its history”44 
composed of a resourceful background temporality. And if, in accordance 
with Hegel, consciousness is the capacity for the analysis (Aufarbeitung) of 
history, then, in accordance with Bourdieu, the consciousness of a discipline 
is its capacity for self-refl exivity (Selbstbearbeitung) in relation to a particular 
fi eld in a given society. To the extent that sociology’s “unconscious is made 
up of its social conditions of production, marked and forgotten”,45 it is the 
task of refl exive sociology to analyse the conditions of its own possibility in 
terms of its embeddedness in society. “If sociology is a critical science, that’s 
perhaps because it is itself in a critical position”,46 namely the critical posi-
tion of being an objectifying part of an objectifi ed society. A truly critical 
perspective, in the Bourdieusian sense, is always already critical of itself. To 
regard social science as a critical science47 means to suggest that “a science of 
the unconscious”48 needs to objectify the unconscious of science.
5. Social science as an evolutionary project versus social science as 
a canonical project
A  fi ft h epistemological tension which is of considerable importance in 
Bourdieu’s writings is rooted in the view that social science constitutes both 
40  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “Une analyse des conditions sociales dans lesquelles 
sont produites les œuvres sociologiques.”





46  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 8.
47  See, for example, BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p. 40 and 46–47.
48  See, for example, BOURDIEU, Leçon sur la leçon, p. 10.
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an evolutionary and a canonical venture. According to Bourdieu’s evolution-
ist conception of knowledge production, the social sciences are inherently 
progressive.49 In order to expose the developmental nature of the social sci-
ences, we need to shed light on the cumulative nature of the production of 
scientifi c knowledge: knowledge claims can compete with each other, they 
can contradict each other, and they can complement each other. Regardless 
of whether the market of knowledge claims is driven mainly by the economic 
principle of competition, the normative force of contradiction, or the discur-
sive processes of complementation, development of scientifi c fi elds is based 
on the systematic accumulation of epistemic representations of the world. 
In this sense, the social sciences permit us to develop increasingly accurate 
conceptual tools aimed at uncovering the underlying mechanisms which 
determine both the constitution and the evolution of the human universe. 
Put briefl y, scientifi c knowledge claims are cumulative knowledge claims.
If we recognise the cumulative nature of systematic forms of knowledge 
production, then we are obliged to accept that both the natural sciences and 
the social sciences are equipped with the evolutionary capacity to develop 
gradually more accurate accounts of their objects of study. As Bourdieu 
remarks, “[t]he progress of knowledge, in the case of social science, presup-
poses a  progress in the knowledge about the conditions of knowledge”,50
and it is the task of a critical epistemology to account for the evolutionary 
character of knowledge growth in both the natural and the social sciences. 
From this perspective, it would be erroneous to assume that cognitive evolu-
tion, based on constant verifi cation and falsifi cation, is an exclusive privilege 
of the natural sciences. Insofar as both natural and social scientists engage 
49  On Bourdieu’s emphasis on the evolutionary nature of scientifi c knowledge, see, for 
example: BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p.  7. Pierre BOURDIEU, Raisons pratiques. Sur la 
théorie de l’action. Paris: Seuil 1994, p.  235–236. BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, 
p. 140. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 34.
On this point, see also, for example: Rolf EICKELPASCH, “Parteiliche Unparteilichkeit. 
Paradoxien in der Begründung einer kritischen Soziologie bei Pierre Bourdieu.” In: 
BITTLINGMAYER, U. H. – EICKELPASCH, R. – KASTNER, R. – RADEMACHER, C. (eds.), 
Th eorie als Kampf? Zur Politischen Soziologie Pierre Bourdieus. Opladen: Leske & Budrich 
2002, p. 49–60, here p. 56. T. M. S. EVENS, “Bourdieu and the Logic of Practice: Is All Giving 
Indian-Giving or Is ‘Generalized Materialism’ not Enough.” Sociological Th eory, vol. 17, 1999, 
no. 1, p. 3–31, here p. 24. George RITZER, “Metatheorizing in Sociology.” In: ROBBINS, D. 
(ed.), Pierre Bourdieu. Volume II. London: Sage 2000 [1990], p. 318–329, here p. 325.
50  BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p.  7 (my translation); original text: “Le progrès de la 
connaissance, dans le cas de la science sociale, suppose un progrès dans la connaissance des 
conditions de la connaissance.”
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in dialogical discourse, they are compelled to revise and reformulate their 
knowledge claims if required. Th e symbolic authority of every cognitive 
claim to scientifi c legitimacy rests upon its persuasive capacity to evoke 
discursively defensible forms of epistemic validity.
Yet, just as Bourdieu emphasises the evolutionary nature of social sci-
ence, he stresses the canonical nature of systematic forms of knowledge 
production.51 Social scientists are, consciously or unconsciously, embedded 
in particular traditions of thought. As a  consequence, their ways of con-
ceptualising the world are, directly or indirectly, infl uenced by the presup-
positional horizons in which they fi nd themselves situated. Th e existence of 
various “sociological paradigm communities”52 is indicative of the presence 
of competing sociological traditions: diff erent sociological thinkers emerge 
out of diff erent sociological traditions. Th e oeuvre of a social thinker emerges 
in relation to pre-existing oeuvres of social thought. Th us, drawing on the 
work of Th omas S. Kuhn,53 Bourdieu insists that the progress of knowledge is 
inconceivable without the formation of “paradigm communities”54 and the 
cyclical emergence of “scientifi c revolutions”.55
From a  Bourdieusian point of view, then, the evolution of scientifi c 
knowledge is contingent upon the canonisation of paradigmatic discourses: 
“the scholars’ actions in the advanced sciences are determined by a  ‘para-
digm’ or a  ‘disciplinary matrix’, that is, a  state of scientifi c achievement 
which is accepted by an important fraction of scholars and which tends to 
impose itself upon all other scholars”.56 Th e power of a paradigm is tanta-
51  On Bourdieu’s emphasis on the canonical nature of scientifi c knowledge, see, for example: 
BOURDIEU, “For a  Sociology of Sociologists,” p.  49. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et 
réfl exivité, p. 35, 39, 43, and 135–136. BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le 
métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques, p. 46.
On this point, see also, for example: Rogers BRUBAKER, “Rethinking Classical Th eory: Th e 
Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu.” Th eory and Society, vol. 14, 1985, no. 6, p. 745–775, 
here p.  756. Alena V. LEDENEVA, “Language as an Instrument of Power in the Works of 
Pierre Bourdieu.” Manchester Sociology Occasional Papers, vol. 41 (November), Editor: Peter 
Halfpenny, Department of Sociology, University of Manchester, 34 pages, 1994, p. 6–8.
52  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 46 (my translation); original text: “sociological paradigm communities”.
53  See esp. Th omas S. KUHN, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions. 3rd Edition. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press 1996 [1962].
54  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques (see previous quotation).
55  Ibid., p. 34 (my translation); original text: “les révolutions scientifi ques”.
56  Ibid., p.  34–35 (my translation); original text: “Les actions des savants dans les sciences 
avancées sont déterminées par un « paradigme », ou « matrice disciplinaire », c’est-à-dire un 
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mount to the power of a culture, for “it determines the questions which can 
be asked and those which are excluded, the thinkable and the unthinkable”.57
To the extent that diff erent scientists function through the construction of 
particular paradigms, diff erent paradigms function through the creation of 
particular scientists; traditions of research are produced and reproduced by 
communities of researchers, and vice versa.
While the positivist conception of science is founded on a developmental 
view of knowledge production, a pragmatist conception of science is based 
on a canonical account of knowledge construction. For whereas “positivist 
philosophy considers the progress of science as a movement of continuous 
accumulation”58 (Wissensanhäufung), pragmatist philosophy regards the 
development of science as a process of constant adaptation (Wissensanpas-
sung). According to the former, scientifi c knowledge needs to be cumula-
tive in order to be innovative; according to the latter, scientifi c knowledge 
needs to be adaptive in order to be eff ective. Every scientifi c language game, 
therefore, is at the same time part of a  particular epistemic development 
(Wissensentwicklung) and part of a given epistemic background (Wissens-
hintergrund): every scientifi c revolution presupposes the existence of an 
intellectual tradition, just as every cognitive transformation presupposes the 
existence of a social constellation.59 Given Bourdieu’s simultaneous empha-
ses on the developmental and the contextual nature of scientifi c knowledge, 
he conceives of social science as both an evolutionary and a canonical project.
6. Social science as an autonomous project versus social science as 
a heteronomous project
A  further epistemological tension in Bourdieu’s writings emerges from 
the insight that, paradoxically, social science is both an autonomous and 
a  heteronomous project. As an autonomous endeavour, the success of sci-
ence is contingent upon its capacity to claim neutrality: the scientifi c fi eld 
has a  tendency to assert its relative independence from other social fi elds, 
notably from the political fi eld, the economic fi eld, and the religious fi eld. As 
état de l’accomplissement scientifi que qui est accepté par une fraction importante des savants 
et qui tend à s’imposer à tous les autres.”
57  Ibid., p. 35 (my translation); original text: “Il détermine les questions qui peuvent être posées 
et celles qui son exclues, le pensable et l’impensable.”
58  Ibid., p. 34 (my translation); original text: “La philosophie positiviste considérant le progrès 
de la science comme un mouvement d’accumulation continu.”
59  See ibid., p. 37 (my translation); original text: “La révolution implique la tradition.”
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a heteronomous endeavour, the development of science is conditional upon 
its ability to accept its own normativity: the lawfulness of the scientifi c fi eld 
is permeated by the interest-ladenness of knowledge production as well as by 
the interest-ladenness of other social fi elds.
Th e assertion of scientifi c autonomy is epitomised in the fact that 
“[t]he distinguishing feature of intellectuals is that they have disinterested 
interests, that they have an interest in disinterestedness”.60 In ideal-typical 
terms, to be scientifi cally autonomous means to be socially disinterested. 
In other words, rather than being driven by the interests of other social 
fi elds, the scientifi c fi eld seeks to assert its autonomy by following the 
interest-laden determinacy of its own fi eld-specifi c teleology: the search for 
scientifi c truths. Diff erent social fi elds are shaped by diff erent normative 
imperatives: in the economic fi eld, actors may claim to make “business for 
the sake of business”; in the artistic fi eld, actors may desire to create “art for 
the sake of art”; in the judicial fi eld, actors may aim to pursue “justice for 
the sake of justice”; in the scientifi c fi eld, actors may search to identify the 
“truth for the sake of truth”.61 Th e relative autonomy of fi elds is founded on 
their capacity to affi  rm their sovereignty by virtue of their own ideology 
and functionality. Th e lawfulness of a given social fi eld manifests itself in 
the interested-ladenness of the actions and interactions undertaken within 
the boundaries of a spatiotemporally structured realm of possibilities. Th us, 
“studying the appearance of a relatively autonomous scientifi c fi eld and the 
social conditions of the autonomization of this fi eld”62 requires accounting 
for the empowering possibility of epistemic sovereignty.
To be sure, the highest degree of scientifi c autonomy is inconceiv-
able without at least a  minimal degree of structural heteronomy. In fact, 
Bourdieu reminds us of the dangers arising from the increasing structural 
heteronomy of the scientifi c fi eld in modern society: “today, the universe 
of science is jeopardised by a  dreadful regression”,63 that is, “science is in 
danger and, therefore, becomes dangerous”.64 What Bourdieu is particularly 
wary of is “the intertwinement of industry and research”,65 which, as he sees 
60  BOURDIEU, “For a Sociology of Sociologists.” p. 49 (italics added).
61  See BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 116–117.
62  BOURDIEU, “For a Sociology of Sociologists,” p. 50 (italics added).
63  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 5 (my translation); original text: “L’univers 
de la science est menacé aujourd’hui d’une redoutable regression.”
64  Ibid., p. 6 (my translation); original text: “La science est en danger et, de ce fait, elle devient 
dangereuse.”
65  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “entrelacement de l’industrie et de la recherche”.
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it, is indicative of “the ‘neo-liberalisation’ of research: the predominance of 
market imperatives”66 in almost every social fi eld, including the scientifi c 
fi eld. Put diff erently, the economic fi eld seems to be strong enough to impose 
its profi t-driven mode of functioning on almost every other social fi eld. “Th e 
logic of competition and commercial interests”67 has intensifi ed “the sense 
of heteronomy”68 brought about by the systemic colonisation of society and 
by the functional imperatives of a ubiquitous market economy. To the extent 
that scientifi c research is “in the service of the management of the estab-
lished order”,69 it fulfi ls the integrative function of reaffi  rming the legitimacy 
of a  given society, thereby accepting the systemic imperatives underlying 
its structural heteronomy. To the extent that scientifi c research is aimed at 
uncovering the relative arbitrariness of ideological taken-for-grantedness, 
it fulfi ls the subversive function of questioning the validity of established 
forms of normativity, thereby illustrating the empowering nature of epis-
temic autonomy.
7. Social science as a unifying project versus social science as a divisive 
project
Another epistemological tension in Bourdieu’s writings can be found in the 
paradoxical assumption that social science constitutes both a unifying and 
a divisive project. Th e tension between the holistic view that science can and 
should strive to be a unifi ed project and the diff erentialist view that science 
can and should strive to be a  divided project is rooted in the normative 
discrepancy between the positivist plea for the creation of an Einheitswis-
senschaft  (in French: science unifi ée; in English: unifi ed science) and the 
hermeneutic insistence on the inevitable existence of Teilungswissenschaft en
(in French: sciences séparées; in English: separated sciences). According to 
the former account, there is no signifi cant ontological or methodological dif-
ference between the natural and the social sciences. According to the latter 
perspective, there are a number of considerable ontological and methodo-
logical diff erences between the natural and the social sciences.
In essence, the positivist idea of the possibility of an Einheitswissen-
schaft  is founded on the holistic belief in the authenticity of an Einheitswelt: 
66  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “la « néo-libéralisation » de la recherche : prédominance 
des impératives du marché”.
67  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “la logique de la concurrence et intérêts commerciaux”.
68  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “le sens de l’hétéronomie”.
69  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 13.
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the natural and the social sciences are not fundamentally dissimilar because 
the natural and the social world are not substantially diff erent. By contrast, 
the hermeneutic idea of the necessity of the Teilungswissenschaft en is based 
on the diff erentialist belief in the plurality of Teilungswelten: the natural and 
the social sciences are fundamentally dissimilar because the natural and the 
social world are substantially diff erent. In light of the positivist view, both 
the natural and the social world are determined by underlying mechanisms 
which shape their respective constitution and evolution; it is the task of 
science to uncover the underlying causality of reality. In light of the her-
meneutic view, the social world is fundamentally diff erent from the natural 
world in that it is composed of purposive and linguistic entities capable of 
attributing meaning to their existence and to the world in which they fi nd 
themselves.
Paradoxically, Bourdieu endorses both views, recognising that the social 
world is both a lawful and a meaningful – i.e. both a causally and an inten-
tionally determined – universe. On the one hand, and in accordance with 
what is commonly described as a positivist conception of reality, Bourdieu 
affi  rms that “[t]he physical world has immanent tendencies and [that] the 
same goes for the social world”.70 For this reason, he warns of the dangers of 
the – somewhat arbitrary – disciplinary separations both between and within 
the natural and the social sciences,71 whose signifi cance manifests itself in 
tendencies towards “premature specialization”72 in the scientifi c fi eld. If one 
succeeds in “getting rid of the trivial diff erence between human agents and 
non-human agents”,73 one can transcend the separation between the social 
and the natural sciences. On the other hand, and in accordance with what is 
generally known as a hermeneutic conception of reality, Bourdieu reminds 
us that “the critique of mechanical positivism serves to affi  rm the subjec-
tive nature of social facts and their irreducibility to the rigorous methods 
70  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 121 (already quoted above) (italics added) 
(my translation); original text: “Le monde physique a des tendances immanentes, et il en va de 
même du monde social”.
71  See BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 19.
72  Ibid.
73  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 63 (my translation); original text: “On 
a fait disparaître la diff érence triviale entre les agents humains et les agents non humains”.
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of science”.74 Th us, he insists that “Diltheyan dualism”,75 which is based on 
the ontological distinction between the natural and the cultural worlds, is 
imperative if one is willing to acknowledge that “social facts diff er from 
the facts of the physical sciences”,76 since they are permeated by “beliefs or 
individual opinions”.77 In brief, society is shaped by the meaning-donating 
resources of subjectivity. If one accepts that there is a  fundamental onto-
logical diff erence between human agents and non-human agents, one has 
to face up to the ineluctable gap between the social and the natural sciences. 
Given his simultaneous endorsement of the holistic and the diff erentialist 
positions, Bourdieu seems to make a case for the paradoxical view that the 
social sciences and the natural sciences are both united and divided.
8. Social science as a  disciplinary project versus social science as 
a transdisciplinary project
A further interesting tension in Bourdieu’s writings stems from the assump-
tion that, in the modern world, scientifi c modes of knowledge production 
can be regarded as both disciplinary and transdisciplinary endeavours. Th e 
disciplinary nature of science is essentially due to the fact that both the 
natural and the social sciences tend to develop multiple areas of expertise. 
Indeed, the discursive specialisation of scientifi city goes hand in hand with 
the structural diff erentiation of society: just as there are more and more 
areas of expertise in the advanced sciences, there is a growing presence of 
specialised fi elds in advanced societies. Societies with specialised fi elds of 
action tend to produce sciences with specialised fi elds of cognition. Weber’s fa-
mous rationalisation thesis, according to which the consolidation of modern 
society manifests itself in the diff erentiation of three cultural value spheres78 
74  BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p. 19 (italics added) (my translation); original text: “La critique du positivisme 
machinal serve à affi  rmer le caractère subjectif des faits sociaux et leur irréductibilité aux 
méthodes rigoureuses de la science”.
75  Ibid., p. 18 (my translation); original text: “dualisme diltheyen”.
76  Ibid., p. 19 (my translation); original text: “les faits sociaux diff èrent des faits des sciences 
physiques”.
77  Ibid. (Bourdieu quoting F. A. van Hayek) (my translation); original text: “des croyances ou 
des opinions individuelles”.
78  See, for example, Max WEBER, Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft . Grundriß der Verstehenden 
Soziologie. 5. Aufl age, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1980 [1922], p. 436, 486, 528, 553, 658, 666, and 
672. See also, for example, Jürgen HABERMAS, Th e Th eory of Communicative Action. Volume 
1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity Press 1987 
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– i.e. science, law, and art – is symptomatic of what may be described as 
the “disciplinisation” of modern social life and modern social thought: we 
are literally “disciplined” to live and think in “disciplinary” ways to ensure 
that we are able to function in a “disciplinary” society. Th e idea of creating 
“interdisciplinary social sciences”79 refl ects an attempt to overcome discipli-
nary boundaries with the aim of consolidating transdisciplinary territories.
From a  Bourdieusian perspective, sociology, in comparison to other 
scientifi c disciplines, can be conceived of as a  “somewhat undisciplined 
discipline”80 in that its very task consists in questioning the legitimacy and 
uncovering the historicity of disciplinary boundaries by exposing them to 
the scrutiny of sociological refl exivity. Th e transdisciplinary character of 
the sociological project obliges us to “abandon the dichotomy between the 
economic and the non-economic”,81 as well as other counterproductive op-
positions, such as the material versus the symbolic, the empirical versus the 
transcendental, the descriptive versus the normative, and the universal ver-
sus the particular – to mention only a few of the most infl uential antinomies 
which pervade the disciplinary separations in the social sciences. Sociology, 
in the most radical sense, is the “science of all the practices”82 that are pre-
sent in the human world, for all human practices need to be understood in 
terms of the social conditions of production which allow for the production 
of social conditions.
Th e epistemic rivalry between sociology and philosophy constitutes 
a paradigmatic struggle over the right to be considered the master discipline, 
that is, the discipline which can claim monopoly over the production of le-
gitimate knowledge. Sociology is to philosophy what science is to religion: 
an epistemic threat to the self-declared legitimacy of an arbitrary authority. 
Scientifi c disciplines impose their authority upon reality to assert the valid-
ity of their own epistemic legitimacy. From the perspective of the scholastic 
[1981], p. 335; and Larry RAY, Rethinking Critical Th eory: Emancipation in the Age of Global 
Social Movements. London: Sage 1993, p. 24.
79  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p.  197 (my translation); original text: 
“sciences sociales interdisciplinaires”.
80  BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 148 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 
“la discipline plutôt indisciplinée”.
81  BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p.  209 (my translation); original text: “abandonner la 
dichotomie de l’économique et du non-économique”.
82  Ibid. (italics added) (my translation); original text: “science de toutes les pratiques”.
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thinker,83 philosophy can be regarded as “the sovereign discipline”,84 thereby 
degrading sociology to “the stigmatised discipline”.85 From a Bourdieusian 
point of view, by contrast, philosophy should be demystifi ed as “the pseudo-
sovereign discipline”, and sociology should be treated as “the anti-sovereign 
discipline”. For, according to Bourdieu, the ultimate source of legitimacy is 
not the epistemic authority invented by intellectual thought experiments of 
scholastic scientifi city, but the historical authority derived from relationally 
defi ned positions within a  confl ict-ridden society. Th e transformation of 
“the position of sociology within the realm of disciplines”86 hinges on rec-
ognition of the positional contingencies which lie at the heart of fi eld-diff er-
entiated societies. Th us, disciplinary separations are both real and imagined: 
as a  powerful reality, the modern sciences are institutionally divided into 
disciplinary fi elds of action; as a powerful imaginary, the modern sciences 
are ideologically divided into disciplinary fi elds of cognition. On both levels, 
however, modern social science is conceivable only as both a  disciplinary 
and a transdisciplinary endeavour.
9. Social science as a  transhistorical project versus social science as 
a sociohistorical project
A  ninth epistemological tension which can be traced in Bourdieu’s writ-
ings originates in the paradoxical assumption that social science can be 
considered as both a  transhistorical and a sociohistorical project. Whereas 
the former view manifests itself in Bourdieu’s belief in the Realpotential of 
reason, the latter perspective is expressed in Bourdieu’s insistence on the 
Realsituation of reason. Bourdieu repeatedly emphasises the ambivalent 
nature of reason: the double-edged ontology of human rationality stems 
from the tension-laden fact that reason constitutes both a transhistorical and 
a sociohistorical force.87
83  On Bourdieu’s critique of scholastic thought, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Le sens 
pratique, p.  47; BOURDIEU, Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, p.  234 and 265; 
Pierre BOURDIEU, “Sur les rapports entre la sociologie et l’histoire en Allemagne et en 
France.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 106–107, 1995, p. 108–122, here p. 115; 
BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 9, 15, 22, 24, 131, and 143; BOURDIEU, “Si le monde 
social m’est supportable, c’est parce que je peux m’indigner.” Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p. 15.
84  See BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 218.
85  See ibid.
86  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 209 (my translation); original text: “la 
position de la sociologie dans l’espace des disciplines”.
87  See, for example, BOURDIEU, Leçon sur la leçon, p. 25.
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As a  transhistorical force, reason is one amongst other aspects of hu-
man life which are “relatively independent from their social conditions of 
production”.88 Hence, when reason serves as an explanatory force by which 
to discover so-called “scientifi c truths”,89 it fulfi ls the universal function of 
uncovering underlying laws which govern the constitution and evolution of 
the world regardless of the historical specifi city of a  given aspect of real-
ity. Acknowledging that there are certain scientifi c truths which transcend 
the spatiotemporal determinacy of diff erent societies, Bourdieu explicitly 
recognises that reason can serve as a transhistorical force insofar as both its 
constitutive nature and its substantive achievements – that is, both reason 
in itself and scientifi c discoveries derived from reasoning – can claim cogni-
tive or normative authority independently of the sociohistorical specifi city 
of their context of emergence. In light of the transhistorical signifi cance of 
reason, Bourdieu warns of the pitfalls of what he considers to be “irrational-
ist relativism”,90 the defence of which has become more and more popular 
in the contemporary social sciences, particularly with the rise of so-called 
culturalist and postmodernist approaches in recent decades.91
As a sociohistorical force, reason is one amongst other aspects of human 
life which can be understood only in relation to, rather than independently 
from, “their social conditions of production”.92 Nevertheless, it is important 
to remember that “to make science an object of historical and sociological 
88  Ibid., p.  24 (italics added) (my translation); original text: “relativement indépendants de 
leurs conditions sociales de production”.
89  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “vérités scientifi ques”.
90  BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 133 (my translation); original text: “relativisme 
irrationaliste”.
91  On Bourdieu’s critique of postmodernist and culturalist approaches in the social sciences, 
see, for example: BOURDIEU, Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, p. 170. BOURDIEU, 
Méditations pascaliennes, p.  132–133. BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p.  47–48. 
BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 5–6. Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc WACQUANT, 
“For a Realpolitik of Reason.” In: BOURDIEU P. – WACQUANT, L. An Invitation to Refl exive 
Sociology Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p. 174–202, here p. 194. Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc 
WACQUANT, “Th e Personal is Social.” In: BOURDIEU P. – WACQUANT, L. An Invitation 
to Refl exive Sociology Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p.  202–215, here p.  203. See also, for 
example, Keith BASSETT, “Postmodernism and the Crisis of the Intellectual: Refl ections on 
Refl exivity, University, and the Scientifi c Field.” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, vol. 14, 1996, no. 5, p. 507–527, and Loïc WACQUANT, “Reason, Ethics, and Politics.” 
In: BOURDIEU P. – WACQUANT, L. An Invitation to Refl exive Sociology Cambridge: Polity 
Press 1992, p. 47–59, here p. 47.
92  BOURDIEU, Leçon sur la leçon, p.  24 (my translation); original text: “leurs conditions 
sociales de production” (already referred to above).
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analysis of science does not at all mean to relativise scientifi c knowledge [...] 
and thereby reduce it to its historical conditions”93 of production. Rather, it 
means to accept that both the constitution and the function of reason need 
to be examined in relation to its social conditions of production, for the most 
abstract processes of cognition and refl ection are embedded in historically 
specifi c settings of action and interaction. Every form of rationality is im-
pregnated with distinctive layers of historicity. Th is is not to suggest, however, 
that Bourdieu’s “historical contextualism”94 and “historical rationalism”95
are hidden forms of “historical relativism”:96 to historicise reason means to 
account for the contextual determinacy, rather than the complete relativity, 
of human rationality. Insisting on the sociohistorical determinacy of rea-
son, Bourdieu explicitly rejects any form of “transhistorical universalism”97
which seeks to uncover “transhistorical truths, independently of history, 
detached from all relations [...], thus, eternally and universally valid”.98
Of course, there are a  number of philosophical approaches which 
have sought to provide universalist accounts of the world in general and 
of reason in particular: Descartes’s interpretation of the relationship be-
tween mind and body, Kant’s notion of the transcendental subject, the early 
Wittgenstein’s inquiry into the underlying grammar of human language, or 
Habermas’s search for the transcendental conditions of rationally guided 
and linguistically mediated forms of communication, to mention only some 
of the most infl uential philosophical frameworks with which Bourdieu takes 
issue.99 According to Bourdieu, all of these approaches are deeply problem-
atic in that they fail to explain the “contingent”100 nature of reason, since they 
overlook, or at least underestimate, the fact that the resourceful power of 
rationality is always contingent upon the sociohistorical determinacy which 
underlies every cognitive claim to epistemic validity. Whereas metaphysical 
philosophy aims to grasp the allegedly transcendental conditions of reason, 
93  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 8 (my translation); original text: “soumettre 
la science à une analyse historique et sociologique de la science ne vise nullement à relativiser 
la connaissance scientifi que en la rapportant et en la réduisant à ses conditions historiques”.
94  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “contextualisme historique”.
95 Ibid. (my translation); original text: “rationalisme historique”.
96  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “relativisme historique”.
97  See ibid., p. 10.
98  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 10 (my translation); original text: “des 
vérités transhistoriques, indépendantes de l’histoire, détachées de tous liens et avec le lieu et le 
moment, donc valables éternellement et universellement”.
99  See ibid., p. 10–11.
100  See ibid., p. 25.
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critical sociology “permits us to describe the social conditions of reason”.101 
Such a sociohistorical analysis of reason allows us to make a case for what 
Bourdieu refers to as the “Realpolitik of reason”,102 that is, a politics of rea-
son which is capable of mobilising the transhistorical potentials inherent in 
rationality whilst recognising the sociohistorical determinacy underlying 
every claim to scientifi city.
10. Social science as an immanent project versus social science as 
a transcendent project
A  tenth signifi cant epistemological tension in Bourdieu’s writings springs 
from the assumption that social science is both an immanent and a transcend-
ent project, that is, it is both a socially immanent and a socially transcendent 
project. As a socially immanent project, critical scientifi c research emerges 
from within the spatiotemporal horizon of a given reality. Th erefore, critical 
researchers need to be prepared to face up to the societal immanence of the 
most radical forms of refl ective transcendence. As a  socially transcendent 
project, critical scientifi c research can seek to go beyond the normative 
parameters of a given reality. In this sense, critical researchers, in addition 
to being able to distance themselves from the givenness of their designated 
sociohistorical horizon, have the capacity to challenge the preponderance 
of societal immanence through the creative forcefulness of refl ective tran-
scendence. A socially immanent undertaking, critical research permits us to 
examine the spatiotemporal specifi city of human reality and thereby capture 
the power of relations which shape the assembled contingency of society. 
A socially transcendent endeavour, critical research enables us to contribute 
to the reinvention of human reality and thereby transform the relations of 
power which underlie the contested determinacy of society.
Th e importance of the transcendent ambition of the Bourdieusian 
project can hardly be overemphasised. Warning that it would be illusory 
to think that sociology could be a purely descriptive endeavour concerned 
exclusively with the representation, rather than the reinvention, of social 
reality, Bourdieu contends that “ formal or formalistic minds generally pro-
duce wretched sociology”.103 A sociology guided merely by the principle of 
101  BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p. 32 (italics added) (my translation); original 
text: “La sociologie permet de décrire les conditions sociales”.
102  Ibid. (my translation); original text: “Realpolitik de la raison”.
103  BOURDIEU, “A Science that Makes Trouble,” p. 10 (italics added).
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representational adequacy fails to do justice to the transformative potentials 
of society. All societies are relationally constructed and can therefore be 
theoretically deconstructed and practically reconstructed. It is the task of 
Bourdieusian sociology to explore the transformative potentials of society 
by casting light on the relational constitution of human reality.
Acknowledging that contestability is an integral feature of every society, 
Bourdieu insists that “[s]ociology is an especially diffi  cult, an especially 
improbable, science”,104 for “[o]ne of the major diffi  culties lies in the fact 
that its objects are stakes in social struggles”.105 Th e social universe is not 
only a world of co-operative entities united by their existential dependence 
on mutual trust and understanding, but also a world of purposive entities 
divided by their interest-laden search for power and resources. Th e interest-
laden nature of social reality manifests itself in the value-laden character 
of social science; there is no value-free knowledge about reality because all 
knowledge is produced within a given society. Not even scientifi c refl exivity 
can escape the omnipresence of social normativity. Only if we recognise the 
normative constitution of human reality can we do justice to the transforma-
tive potentials inherent in society.
I too sometimes wonder if the completely transparent and disenchanted social 
universe that would be produced by a social science that was fully developed 
(and widely diff used, if that could ever be the case) would not be impossible to 
live in. I think, all the same, that social relations would be much less unhappy if 
people at least understood the mechanisms that lead them to contribute to their 
own deprivation.106
Faced with the challenge of human deprivation, a refl exive social science 
should aim to contribute not only to the critical examination of a society that 
compels every individual to function in accordance with the instrumental 
imperatives of an interest-laden reality, but also to the purposive construc-
tion of a society that enables its members to mobilise their self-empowering 
resources and thereby realise their emancipatory potentials.
104  Ibid., p. 9.
105  Ibid. (italics added).




Th e foregoing analysis has examined ten epistemological tensions underly-
ing Bourdieu’s conception of social science. Th e insights of this study, which 
support the view that Bourdieu’s account of social-scientifi c knowledge 
production is far more fi ne-grained than is commonly assumed, can be 
synthesised as follows.
1. As a scientifi c project, social science is aimed at providing accurate ac-
counts of how the social world is organised. To this end, it is guided by 
criteria of scientifi city, such as objectivity, adequacy, and verifi ability. 
As a  political project, social science is committed to off ering engaged 
accounts of how the social world could and should be organised. In so 
doing, it is inspired by criteria of political normativity, such as legiti-
macy, effi  cacy, and implementability.
2. As an uncovering project, social science aims to shed light on the un-
derlying mechanisms that determine both the constitution and the 
evolution of the social world. To the extent that social scientists seek to 
explore the immanent tendencies which permeate the energy of social 
physics with the functionality of social fi elds, they are concerned with 
examining the ontology of the social world. As a reconstructing project, 
social science aims to interpret the various meanings ordinary actors 
attribute to reality by means of their symbolic construction of society. 
To the extent that social scientists seek to interpret the meanings which 
imbue the energy of social physics with the symbolic resources of every-
day hermeneutics, they are concerned with studying the phenomenology 
of the social world.
3. As an explanatory project, social science follows the methodological 
imperative of Erklären (expliquer): social science can be considered as 
a tool by which to explain the nature of the underlying structures which 
determine human actors’ engagement with the world. As an interpretive 
project, social science is motivated by the methodological imperative 
of Verstehen (comprendre): social science can be regarded as a  tool by 
which to understand the nature of the fi eld-specifi c discourses through 
which human actors interpret the world.
4. As an assertive project, social science has a  constative function: its 
analysis of human reality is based on the methodical representation of 
social facts. As a refl exive project, social science has a critical function: 
its analysis of human reality is committed not only to questioning the 
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legitimacy of established forms of normativity but also to examining the 
conditions of possibility underlying the discursive exercise of critical 
refl exivity.
5. As an evolutionary project, social science contributes to the cumulative
production of knowledge. Insofar as discursive truth claims concerning 
the functioning of the human world may either contradict or comple-
ment each other, they contribute to the progress of the social sciences. 
As a canonical project, social science is shaped by the adaptive produc-
tion of knowledge. Insofar as discursive truth claims concerning the 
functioning of the human world emerge out of diff erent intellectual 
traditions, they refl ect the canonical divisions in the social sciences. Th e 
evolution of scientifi c knowledge is contingent upon the canonisation of 
paradigmatic discourses.
6. As an autonomous project, the success of social science rests upon its 
ability to claim neutrality: the scientifi c fi eld has a  tendency to assert 
its relative independence from other social fi elds. As a  heteronomous
project, the development of science hinges upon its capacity to face up 
to its own normativity: like any other social fi eld, the scientifi c fi eld is 
permeated by competing and confl icting interests pursued by position-
ally situated actors with dispositionally specifi c resources. Th e relative 
autonomy of cognitive claims to epistemic validity cannot be dissociated 
from the relative heteronomy of all purposive dimensions of social real-
ity, since every quest for scientifi c neutrality is embedded in a horizon of 
social normativity.
7. As a  unifying project, social science needs to recognise that the pos-
sibility of an Einheitswissenschaft  is anticipated by the authenticity of 
an Einheitswelt: the natural and the social sciences should strive for the 
construction of a  unifi ed science, because the natural world and the 
social world are part of one and the same universe. As a divisive project, 
social science needs to acknowledge that the plurality of the Teilungs-
wissenschaft en refl ects the multiplicity of Teilungswelten: the natural 
and the social sciences are methodologically divided forms of inquiry, 
because the natural world and the social world constitute ontologically 
distinct realms of reality.
8. As a  disciplinary project, social science cannot but accept that the 
discursive specialisation of scientifi city goes hand in hand with the 
structural diff erentiation of society: the increasing number of areas of 
expertise in the advanced sciences corresponds to the growing amount 
of specialised fi elds in complex societies. As a transdisciplinary project, 
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social science needs to question the pervasive taken-for-grantedness of 
disciplinary boundaries by problematising the relative arbitrariness of 
specialised fi elds of knowledge: every attempt to overcome disciplinary 
boundaries potentially contributes to the consolidation of transdiscipli-
nary territories.
9. As a transhistorical project, social science can claim cognitive authority 
by virtue of a universalising rationality which transcends its own socio-
historical specifi city: the force réelle of the reasoning subject transcends 
the situation réelle of the reasoned object. As a sociohistorical project, 
social science can claim normative authority insofar as it recognises that 
rationality is always conditioned by its own sociohistorical specifi city: 
the politique réelle embraced by a given community is embedded in the 
situation réelle shaped by its own history.
10. As an immanent project, social science, even in its most radical and 
unorthodox versions, needs to face up to the fact that it emerges from 
within the spatiotemporal horizon of a given reality. As a transcendent 
project, social science can seek to go beyond the normative parameters 
of a particular historical constellation, enabling us not only to question 
the legitimacy of diff erent forms of social organisation, but also to con-
tribute to both individual and collective processes of emancipation.
Th e detailed examination of the aforementioned epistemological ten-
sions illustrates that the predominant view that Bourdieu’s conception of 
social science is essentially founded on positivist presuppositions fails to 
do justice to Bourdieu’s account of social-scientifi c knowledge production, 
which is far more insightful than generally acknowledged. In light of the 
above analysis, a  fi ne-grained picture emerges which demonstrates that 
Bourdieu invites, and indeed compels, us to refl ect upon the complexity of 
the various tension-laden tasks intrinsic to the pursuit of a  critical social 
science.
Yet, even if we recognise that Bourdieu’s conception of social science is 
a highly complex one and that, contrary to common belief, he off ers a re-
markably insightful account of the nature of systematic forms of knowledge 
production, we need to go one step further and refl ect upon the shortcom-
ings and limitations inherent in the epistemological presuppositions of 
Bourdieusian thought. If, in accordance with Bourdieu, we seek to be genu-
inely committed to the idea of sociological refl exivity, then it is not only rea-
sonable but also essential to shed light on the pitfalls and problems arising 
from the epistemological presuppositions underlying Bourdieu’s account of 
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social science. Hence, following the structure of the previous analysis, this 
paper shall conclude by arguing that, given that it is far from clear whether 
or not the aforementioned epistemological tensions can be reconciled, the 
Bourdieusian account of scientifi c knowledge production is problematic in 
the following respects.
1. Sociology can be characterised as both a scientifi c project, which is aimed 
at providing accurate accounts of how the social world is organised, and 
a political project, which is committed to off ering engaged accounts of 
how the social world could and should be organised. In other words, 
social research can be guided by criteria of scientifi city as much as it 
can be motivated by criteria of normativity. Yet, the epistemological ten-
sion between scientism and normativism, which lies at the heart of the 
Bourdieusian conception of social research, poses a number of serious 
analytical problems. Even if we are willing to accept that every society is 
never simply a world of facticity but always also a world of validity, and 
even if we share the assumption that sociology should aim to provide 
both descriptive knowledge about and normative knowledge for the 
social world, it is questionable whether or not Bourdieu’s claim that 
“[s]ociology seems to [...] have all the properties that defi ne a science”107 
is reconcilable with his somewhat self-critical confession that “[s]ocio-
logy has the unfortunate privilege of being constantly confronted with 
the question of its status as a science”.108 In essence, Bourdieu’s insist-
ence upon the scientifi city of sociology rests on his belief in the positiv-
ity, objectivity, and universality of compelling knowledge claims. What 
Bourdieu does not analyse in any great depth, however, are the roles of 
linguisticality, subjectivity, and relativity in the normative construction 
of social-scientifi c knowledge.109 Given that every scientifi c approach to 
society is conceivable only as a linguistically mediated relation to reality, 
107  Ibid., p. 8.
108  Ibid.
109  In all fairness, it has to be said that cursory remarks on the role of linguisticality, subjectivity, 
and relativity in the production of social-scientifi c knowledge can be found, for instance, 
in BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables 
épistémologiques, p.  19, 52, 69–70, 99–102, and 158. On this point, see also, for example: 
Pierre BOURDIEU, “Le champ scientifi que.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 
8–9 [2-3], 1976, p. 88–104, esp. p. 89–94. Pierre BOURDIEU, Questions de Sociologie. Paris: 
Minuit 1984, esp. p.  19–36, 37–60, 86–94, 121–137. BOURDIEU, “La cause de la science,” 
esp. p. 3–7. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, esp. 141–165. Pierre BOURDIEU, 
“Wittgenstein, le sociologisme & la science sociale.” In: BOUVERESSE, J. – LAUGIER, S. – 
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the reliability of experience-based knowledge is contingent upon the 
representational capacity of language. Since every scientifi c explanation 
rests upon a  subjectively formulated interpretation of the world, the 
possibility of epistemic value-freeness is undermined by the omnipres-
ent reality of positionally structured forms of value-ladenness. If every 
scientifi c generalisation about the world can assert epistemic authority 
only insofar as it recognises the contextually contingent relativity of all 
claims to representational accuracy, then the forcefulness of discursive 
claims to universal validity hinges upon the spatiotemporally consti-
tuted arbitrariness of social legitimacy. In short, the epistemic ideal of 
scientifi city cannot rise above the social constraints of linguistically 
mediated, subjectively mobilised, and contextually anchored forms of 
normativity.
2. Social science can be conceived of as both an uncovering project, aimed 
at shedding light on the underlying mechanisms which determine the 
nature and development of the social world, and a reconstructing pro-
ject, which permits us to study the multifaceted ways in which people’s 
actions are imbued with meaning. Put diff erently, social science is 
concerned with both the ontology and the phenomenology of the human 
world. It is far from clear, however, to what extent the tension between 
ontological realism and phenomenological constructivism can be re-
solved. Even if we assume that Bourdieu is right to assert that “[o]f all the 
oppositions that artifi cially divide social science, the most fundamental, 
and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism 
and objectivism”,110 and even if we share the view that a critical “science 
of the social world”111 should set itself the task of “moving beyond the 
antagonism between these two modes of knowledge, while preserving 
the gains from each of them”,112 we have to accept that the realist am-
bition to uncover society’s structurally constituted lawfulness and the 
interpretivist mission to reconstruct society’s interactionally established 
meaning-ladenness are two entirely diff erent analytical endeavours. If 
ROSAT, J.-J. (eds.), Wittgenstein, dernières pensées Marseille: Fondation Hugot du Collège de 
France, Agone 2002, p. 343–353, esp. p. 347–352.
110  BOURDIEU, Th e Logic of Practice, p. 25.
See also original publication: Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 43: “De toutes les oppositions qui 
divisent artifi ciellement la science sociale, la plus fondamentale, et la plus ruineuse, est celle 
qui s’établit entre le subjectivisme et l’objectivisme.”
111  Ibid.
112  Ibid. (translation modifi ed).
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our task consists, fi rst and foremost, in uncovering the underlying 
mechanisms that determine the constitution and evolution of the social 
world, then the various meanings which human beings attribute, rightly 
or wrongly, to their existence are relevant only insofar as they shape, 
directly or indirectly, the structural arrangements that have a  con-
straining infl uence on their actions. If, by contrast, our task consists 
primarily in reconstructing the infi nite meanings that human actors 
attach to reality through their symbolic construction of society, then 
the underlying mechanisms by which people’s actions are, at least partly, 
determined are only relevant insofar as they constitute the relationally 
structured background of a  performatively constructed foreground. 
In brief, the ontology and the phenomenology of the social world are 
two interrelated but irreducible components of the human universe. 
To the extent that the social condition of being in the world and the 
social construction of meaning about the world concern two intimately 
intertwined but functionally distinct dimensions of human existence, 
the challenge consists in cross-fertilising the respective insights gained 
from ontological realism and phenomenological constructivism, while 
recognising that they designate fundamentally diff erent, albeit not mu-
tually exclusive, epistemological frameworks.
3. Social science can be regarded as both an explanatory project, which is 
guided by the methodological challenge of Erklären and thus aimed at 
examining the functional constitution of social arrangements, and an 
interpretive project, which is motivated by the methodological maxim 
of Verstehen and hence oriented towards exploring the symbolic con-
stitution of social relations. From this perspective, social research is 
concerned with both the structurally embedded interest-ladenness and 
the symbolically mediated meaning-ladenness of the human world. Yet, 
even if we account for the interdependence of the interest-laden forces 
and the meaning-laden resources of social life, the epistemological ten-
sion between the positivist trust in the explanatory power of social sci-
ence and the hermeneutic reliance on the interpretive accomplishments 
of social actors cannot be resolved simply by demonstrating that the 
paradigm of Erklären and the paradigm of Verstehen constitute irreduc-
ible components in the Bourdieusian universe of refl exive knowledge 
production. Th e point is not to suggest that emphasis upon the explana-
tory functions of social science and insistence upon the interpretive 
resources of social actors contradict one another; rather, the point is to 
acknowledge that it would be naïve to believe that the epistemological 
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antinomy between the paradigm of explanation and the paradigm of 
interpretation can be overcome by assuming that they constitute com-
plementary, rather than contradictory, modes of knowledge production. 
Th e epistemological divide between the Marxian view that “all science 
would be superfl uous if the outward appearance and the essence of 
things directly coincided”113 and the Weberian view that “[s]ociology 
[...] is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of 
social action”114 is indicative of the far-reaching normative implications 
arising from the methodological separation, in modern social thought, 
between the paradigm of explanation and the paradigm of interpreta-
tion. Regardless of whether we subscribe to the positivist view that “the 
world has been interpreted in various ways, while the point is to explain 
it” or to the interpretivist view that “the world has been explained in 
various ways, while the point is to understand it”, the paradigm of 
Erklären and the paradigm of Verstehen are incommensurable in that 
their divergent presuppositional horizons generate fundamentally dif-
ferent types of knowledge. Th e former seeks to uncover the underlying 
forces of the world regardless of ordinary people’s observations and 
interpretations; the latter aims to study the meanings attributed to the 
world depending on ordinary people’s perceptions and representations. 
To the extent that the paradigm of explanation and the paradigm of in-
terpretation refl ect two idiosyncratic epistemological positions, we have 
to accept that the explanatory study of the interest-laden constitution of 
society and the interpretive study of the meaning-laden interaction with 
reality represent essentially diff erent explorative endeavours.
4. Social science can be considered as both an assertive project, based on 
the methodical representation of social facts, and a  refl exive project, 
committed not only to questioning the legitimacy of established forms of 
normativity but also to exploring the conditions of possibility underly-
ing the discursive exercise of critical refl exivity. Nonetheless, even if we 
share Bourdieu’s view that social scientists should seek to contribute to 
the possibility of human emancipation as well as to refl exive processes of 
self-critical problematisation, we must neither overestimate sociology’s 
capacity to have a substantial impact upon the development of society 
113  Karl Marx, Capital. Volume III, chapter 48, 1974 [1894], p. 817, quoted in Jorge LARRAIN, 
“Stuart Hall and the Marxist Concept of Ideology.” In: MORLEY, D. – CHEN, K.-H. (eds.), 
Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies London: Routledge 1996, p. 47–70.
114  Max WEBER, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press 1978 [1922], p. 4.
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nor misjudge sociologists’ ability to subject the historical conditions of 
epistemic validity to self-critical scrutiny. Th e Enlightenment dream of 
human progress based on individual autonomy and social responsibility 
has been shattered too oft en by the ubiquitous power of systemic heter-
onomy and instrumental rationality. Th e scientistic belief in sociology’s 
capacity to shape, or even steer, the development of society fails to ac-
knowledge that genuine processes of human emancipation are realised 
not through exogenously stipulated mechanisms of disempowering 
orchestration “from above” but through endogenously motivated pro-
cesses of self-empowering exploration “from below”. If social scientists 
are portrayed as the enlightening vanguards of political transformation 
and ordinary actors are reduced to docile puppets blinded by the false 
consciousness of doxic illusions, then we relegate the possibility of col-
lective emancipation to the sterile imaginary of intellectual orchestra-
tion. If the twentieth century has taught us one lesson, it is that totally 
administered societies do not need totally administered revolutions.
5. Social science constitutes both an evolutionary project, in which the dis-
cursive exchange of competing truth claims contributes to the general 
progress of knowledge, and a canonical project, in which the epistemic 
formation of shared presuppositions is refl ected in the emergence of 
increasingly diff erentiated intellectual traditions. In this sense, the 
very possibility of social science not only presupposes an underlying 
teleology of cumulative knowledge production, but also requires the 
functional elasticity of adaptive knowledge construction. Yet, despite 
the undeniable confl uence of the cumulative and the adaptive capacities 
of scientifi c research, refl ection on the tension between knowledge-
theoretic evolutionism and fi eld-theoretic contextualism poses more 
questions than it provides answers. In its most ambitious variant, an 
evolutionist view of human cognition suggests that science permits 
us to raise cumulative knowledge claims which, regardless of their 
presuppositional specifi city, allow us to paint an increasingly accurate 
picture of the underlying forces of reality. Conversely, a  contextualist 
conception of human cognition is founded on the assumption that sci-
ence enables us to raise adaptive knowledge claims which, depending on 
their presuppositional determinacy, authorise us to develop consensual, 
and hence increasingly diversifi ed, approaches to particular aspects of 
reality. If the validity of epistemic authority derives from a truth claim’s 
representational capacity to provide a cogent explanatory account based 
on the closest proximity to the actual functioning of reality, then the 
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consensual constraints imposed by a given intellectual community can 
be epistemically transcended only by the evidence-based forcefulness 
of scientifi c discursiveness. If, however, the acceptability of epistemic 
authority rests on the legitimacy granted by a given scientifi c commu-
nity, then the ideal of scientifi city, based on the belief in representational 
accuracy and evolutionary knowledgeability, is undermined by the 
presuppositional arbitrariness which permeates every consensus-based 
form of canonical taken-for-grantedness. In short, in Bourdieu’s writ-
ings on scientifi c knowledge production, the tension between cognitive 
evolutionism and epistemic contextualism persists.
6. Paradoxically, social science can be conceived of as both an autonomous 
and a heteronomous project. To the extent that the scientifi c fi eld succeeds 
in defending its relative independence from other social fi elds, it enjoys 
a healthy degree of autonomy; to the extent that the scientifi c fi eld can be 
colonised by other social fi elds, it suff ers from a considerable degree of 
heteronomy. Yet, just as we need to acknowledge the paradoxical fact that 
social research is a  tension-laden endeavour which seeks to defend its 
relative independence from external constraints, whilst having to accept 
its relative dependence upon these constraints, we have to avoid falling 
into the traps of intellectual idealism and social determinism. Bourdieu is 
right to insist that, at least in principle, all social fi elds have the capacity 
to assert their relative autonomy in relation to other spheres of society, 
just as all social fi elds are pervaded by a degree of heteronomy which is 
indicative of their historical determinacy. Even if, however, we assume 
that the pursuit of a critical social science is inconceivable without the 
discursive exercise of constant refl exivity, the extent to which the search 
for scientifi c autonomy will allow academic disciplines to claim intel-
lectual and institutional sovereignty without being dominated by the 
structural constraints of a market-driven society remains to be seen.
7. From a  Bourdieusian perspective, the natural and the social sciences 
are united by the fact that both are concerned with uncovering the 
underlying laws which govern the functioning of the world, and they 
are divided by the fact that the social world, unlike the natural world, 
is a cultural realm constructed by meaning-producing entities, whose 
anthropological specifi city cannot be grasped by virtue of a positivist 
methodology. In order that we recognise that the social world is both 
a  lawful and a  meaningful realm composed of human interactions, 
we need to face up to the epistemological tension between the holistic 
position, according to which a single world requires a unifi ed science, 
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and the diff erentialist position, according to which fundamentally 
diff erent ontologies require substantially divergent methodologies. 
Considering the fact that in his earlier works Bourdieu clearly favoured 
the former – arguably positivist – view115, whereas in some of his later 
writings he moved towards the latter – arguably interpretivist – view,116
at the heart of the Bourdieusian project there appears to lie an episte-
mological opposition comparable to the philosophical tension between 
the early Wittgenstein’s logical positivism117 and the late Wittgenstein’s 
ordinary language philosophy.118 It may be relatively straightforward to 
identify this tension;119 it is extremely diffi  cult, however, to make sense 
of it. Th e paradigmatic gap between the early Wittgenstein’s focus on 
propositionally structured knowledge claims and the late Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on contextually contingent language games is irresolvable to 
the extent that a correspondence theory of truth, founded on the alleg-
edly transcendental nature underlying the logical and representational 
resources of language, and an emergence theory of truth, based on the 
presumably contextual nature permeating the referential and societal 
construction of language, cannot exist side by side as reconcilable epis-
temological positions. Similarly, the paradigmatic gap between the early 
Bourdieu’s insistence on the interest-laden lawfulness of the social world 
and the late Bourdieu’s concern with the meaning-laden arbitrariness of 
the human universe is problematic to the extent that a positivist concep-
tion of scientifi c knowledge, which suggests that the social sciences have 
to confront the explanatory task of uncovering underlying patterns of 
determinacy, and an interpretivist conception of scientifi c knowledge, 
which assumes that the social sciences have to take on the hermeneutic 
task of exploring human actions in terms of their intelligibility, cannot 
be easily reconciled.
115  See, for example, BOURDIEU, “Le champ scientifi que,” and BOURDIEU – 
CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques, esp. 
p. 27–49 and 100–102.
116  See, for example, Pierre BOURDIEU, “Comprendre.” In: BOURDIEU, P. (ed.), La misère du 
monde Paris: Seuil 1993, p. 1389–1447.
117  See Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Logisch-philosophische 
Abhandlung. 6. Aufl age, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1969 [1921].
118  See Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchungen. 3. Aufl age, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp 1982 [1953].
119  Of course, Bourdieu was well aware of the philosophical tension between the early and 




8. Just as disciplinary divisions play a  major role in the organisational 
and intellectual diff erentiation of the social sciences, transdisciplinary 
dialogue lies at the heart of critical social analysis. Contemporary social 
research is marked not only by deep material and symbolic divisions be-
tween diff erent disciplines, but also by constructive and innovative ways 
of cutting across established disciplinary boundaries. A curious para-
dox with which we are confronted is the fact that disciplinary bounda-
ries are both real and imagined: they are real because they shape the 
institutional and ideological horizons in accordance with which social 
scientists undertake and discuss their research; at the same time, they 
are imagined because clear-cut separations between established modes 
of research are always to some degree artifi cial, and hardly any domain 
in the social sciences can claim to have been monopolised by one par-
ticular discipline. Of course, disciplinary traditions have a substantial 
impact upon the practical organisation and theoretical structuration of 
scientifi c research; in this sense, disciplinary boundaries are not only 
real but tremendously powerful, contributing to both the institutional 
ramifi cation and the ideological canonisation of knowledge produc-
tion. Yet, disciplinary comfort zones are never hermetically sealed but 
are unavoidably infl uenced by knowledge which transcends epistemic 
boundaries. In other words, almost no fi eld of research can avoid draw-
ing, implicitly or explicitly, on various epistemic frameworks generated 
by diff erent disciplines. Th e question remains, however, whether or 
not the disciplinary specialisation of knowledge is both an inevitable 
and a  desirable feature of social evolution. Although Bourdieu’s fi eld 
theory is useful in illustrating that societies with diff erentiated spheres 
of interaction tend to generate diversifi ed realms of cognition, it does 
not address the question to what extent the disciplinary demarcation 
and the transdisciplinary orientation of scientifi c research constitute 
evolutionary preconditions for the fruitful development and constant 
improvement of large-scale processes of knowledge production in ad-
vanced societies. If disciplinary diff erentiation and transdisciplinary 
communication together constitute the sine qua non of modern scientifi c 
research, then, contrary to Bourdieu’s scepticism towards evolutionary 
theories of society in general and of language in particular,120 we need to 
120  See, for instance, Bourdieu’s critique of Habermas’s communication-theoretic evolutionism: 
BOURDIEU, Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, p.  165, 170–171, and 235–236. 
BOURDIEU, “La cause de la science,” p. 10. BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 32, 80, 
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explore the extent to which, in late modern forms of social organisation, 
the evolution of human cognition is inconceivable without the discipli-
nary organisation of scientifi c investigation.
9. Social science can be conceived of as both a  transhistorical project, 
whose universalising rationality seeks to transcend the contextual 
specifi city of its own spatiotemporal determinacy, and a sociohistorical
project, whose normative authority is contingent upon the ideological 
legitimacy of its own claims to epistemic validity. From this perspec-
tive, social research is concerned with the study of both the universal 
conditions of action and cognition, which transcend the spatiotemporal 
specifi city of a given society, and the particular conditions of action and 
cognition, which constitute a  praxeological background of historical 
contingency. Deeply suspicious of universalist accounts of reason and 
society, Bourdieu sought to shed light on the historical conditions un-
derlying the development of modern conceptions of cognition and ac-
tion. Yet, although one of the main aims of Bourdieu’s work was to over-
come counterproductive antinomies in social and political thought,121
81, 95, 99, 128, 131, 143, 145, 292 n. 13, 296 n. 8, 296–297 n. 9, and 297 n. 10. Pierre BOURDIEU, 
Les usages sociaux de la science. Pour une sociologie clinique du champ scientifi que. Paris: INRA 
1997, p. 60. Pierre BOURDIEU, “Scattered Remarks.” European Journal of Social Th eory, vol. 
2, 1999, no. 3, p. 333–340, here p. 338. BOURDIEU, Esquisse pour une auto-analyse (Paris: 
Raisons d’agir, 2004), p.  13. BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, “Interest, Habitus, Rationality,” 
p. 139. Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc WACQUANT, “Language, Gender, and Symbolic Violence.” 
In: BOURDIEU, P. – WACQUANT, L. An Invitation to Refl exive Sociology Cambridge: Polity 
Press 1992, p. 140–174, here p. 147, 154 n. 109, and 156. BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, “For 
a Realpolitik of Reason,” p. 188–189. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 10, 48, 
and 161–162.
121  On Bourdieu’s ambition to overcome counterproductive antinomies in social and political 
thought, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p. 29, 43, 46, 77, 78, 87, 103, 135–138, 
178, 202, 209, 234, and 242. BOURDIEU, Le sens pratique, p. 43, 46, 78, 87, 103, 178, 202, 234, 
and 242. Bourdieu, Leçon sur la leçon, p. 35–37. Pierre BOURDIEU, “L’économie des échanges 
linguistiques.” In: BOURDIEU, P. Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques
Paris: Fayard 1982, p. 11–21, here p. 14. Pierre BOURDIEU, “La production et la reproduction 
de la langue légitime.” In: BOURDIEU, P. Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges 
linguistiques Paris: Fayard 1982, p. 23–58, here p. 36. Pierre BOURDIEU, “Espace social et 
genèse des ‘classes’.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 52–53, 1984, p. 3–14, here 
p. 5. BOURDIEU, “Th e Paradox of the Sociologist,” p. 55, 57, and 59. BOURDIEU, Raisons 
pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, p. 169. Pierre BOURDIEU, “Stratégies de reproduction 
et modes de domination.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol. 105, 1994, p. 3–12, 
here p.  3. BOURDIEU, “La cause de la science,” p.  8. BOURDIEU, “Sur les rapports entre 
la sociologie et l’histoire en Allemagne et en France,” p.  120. BOURDIEU, Méditations 
pascaliennes, p. 16–17, 43, 77, 122, 157, 159–160, 163–167, 185, and 225. Pierre BOURDIEU, 
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substantive parts of his own writings remain trapped in the aporia of 
paradigmatic oppositions, including the epistemological opposition 
between universalist and contextualist accounts of knowledge. To the 
extent that Bourdieu’s social theory not only reproduces the antinomy 
between universalist and contextualist approaches to knowledge but 
also favours the latter over the former, we are left  in an epistemic no-
man’s-land, in which the transcendental pretensions of metaphysical 
philosophy122 and the relativist pitfalls of postmodern sociology123 are 
rightly criticised, but in which no viable epistemological alternative is 
off ered apart from a vague plea for a Realpolitik of reason,124 founded on 
the legitimate, but not particularly insightful, assumption that in order 
to understand the historical constitution of knowledge claims we need 
to examine “their social conditions of production”.125 Th e question is not 
whether or not knowledge and reason are expressed in sociohistorically 
contingent horizons of cognition and action; rather, the question is to 
what extent the very possibility of linguistic claims to epistemic valid-
ity depends on the interplay between the transhistorical potentials of 
rationality and the sociohistorical conditions of reality.
La domination masculine. Paris: Seuil 1998, p.  9 and 110. Pierre BOURDIEU, Th e Social 
Structures of the Economy. Trans. C. Turner. Cambridge: Polity Press 2005 [2000], p. 210–213. 
BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p. 7, 24, and 31. BOURDIEU, Science de la science 
et réfl exivité, p.  76, 151, and 153. BOURDIEU, “Wittgenstein, le sociologisme & la science 
sociale,” p.  353. BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON – PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. 
Préalables épistémologiques, p. 34, 93–94, and 101. Pierre BOURDIEU – Loïc WACQUANT, 
“Sociology as Socioanalysis”. In: BOURDIEU, P. – WACQUANT, L. An Invitation to Refl exive 
Sociology Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p. 62–74, here p. 66. BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, 
“Interest, Habitus, Rationality,” p. 121–122. BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, “Language, Gender, 
and Symbolic Violence,” p. 151 and 162.
122  On Bourdieu’s critique of metaphysical thought, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Le sens 
pratique, p. 41, 43, 47–49, 61, 67. BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 56, 90, 93, 96, 99–
100, 113, 137, 141, 143, and 265. BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p. 15. BOURDIEU, 
Science de la science et réfl exivité, esp. p. 77–78 and 217. BOURDIEU – CHAMBOREDON 
– PASSERON, Le métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques, p. 101.
123  On Bourdieu’s critique of postmodern thought, see, for example: BOURDIEU, Raisons 
pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, p. 170. BOURDIEU, Méditations pascaliennes, p. 132–133. 
BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p.  47–48. BOURDIEU, Science de la science et 
réfl exivité, p. 5–6. BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, An Invitation to Refl exive Sociology, p. 47 and 
203.
124  See, for example, BOURDIEU, Entretien avec Antoine Spire, p.  32 (my translation), and 
BOURDIEU – WACQUANT, “For a Realpolitik of Reason,” p. 194.
125  BOURDIEU, Leçon sur la leçon, p.  24 (my translation); original text: “leurs conditions 
sociales de production” (already referred to above).
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10. Critical research, in the Bourdieusian sense, is both a socially immanent
and a  socially transcendent undertaking insofar as it seeks to encour-
age not only a  refl ective and enlightening, but also a  purposive and 
empowering engagement with the world. Social science can provide 
fairly reliable descriptions of particular aspects of human reality, while 
uncovering the relative historical arbitrariness, and questioning the ide-
ological taken-for-grantedness, of all malleable dimensions of society. 
If, in accordance with Bourdieu, we assume that adequate description 
and radical questioning of the human world constitute integral compo-
nents of critical social research, then we are forced to abandon a rigid 
separation between factual statements and value judgements, thereby 
accepting that objectivity and normativity are both ontologically – that 
is, in all forms of socialisation – and epistemologically – that is, in all 
modes of rationalisation – interrelated. Yet Bourdieu’s suggestion that 
sociology can be conceived of as “a continuation of politics with other 
means”126 is problematic if the refl exive sociologist is portrayed as a sci-
entifi c messiah who stands above the rest of humanity and whose task 
is to enlighten all those who remain caught up in the doxic universe of 
common sense based on habitual misperceptions, stereotypical misrep-
resentations, and ideological misinterpretations. To be sure, Bourdieu 
is right to regard sociology as a  normative tool which equips us with 
the conceptual and methodological resources necessary to demystify 
the taken-for-grantedness of codifi ed social arrangements, thereby 
reminding us of the relative arbitrariness of established power relations. 
If, however, critical capacity is conceived of as a professional privilege 
monopolised by refl exive social scientists trained to “see through” the 
widely accepted misconceptions derived from common sense and ex-
pressed in various forms of false consciousness, then we underestimate 
the extent to which ordinary people are capable not only of purposive 
action but also of discursive refl ection. If refl exive actors have the abil-
ity to question the legitimacy of the relationally constituted elements of 
their society, this is because the critical position is part of the human 
condition.
126  BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réfl exivité, p. 193 (my translation); original text: “un 
moyen de continuer la politique par d’autres moyens”.
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